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	<title>Comments on: How The Media Lost In Basra</title>
	<atom:link href="http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/</link>
	<description>Defending the liberal tradition in history, science, and philosophy.</description>
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		<title>By: The Dominant Media rooting for the enemy and getting it WRONG &#171; DPGI - the aftermath</title>
		<link>http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-168044</link>
		<dc:creator>The Dominant Media rooting for the enemy and getting it WRONG &#171; DPGI - the aftermath</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Jan 2009 22:16:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-168044</guid>
		<description>[...] April 16, 2008 &#183; No Comments  Via Dean&#8217;s World: How The Media Lost In Basra [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] April 16, 2008 &middot; No Comments  Via Dean&#8217;s World: How The Media Lost In Basra [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Martin L. Shoemaker</title>
		<link>http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154283</link>
		<dc:creator>Martin L. Shoemaker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 16:21:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154283</guid>
		<description>&lt;blockquote&gt;Poorly planned, not executed well â€¦ but &lt;i&gt;executed&lt;/i&gt;, and ongoing.
&lt;/blockquote&gt;

Frankly, I&#039;m astonished at how well the Iraqi Army is doing, and disgusted by the impossible standards their critics expect them to meet.

We have dedicated military academies to create junior officers who are ready to command basic operations. This within a well-established military culture and a structure all designed to help create seasoned officers while accomplishing missions. Parallel to this, we have bootcamp programs honed over centuries to prepare new recruits for the field, and other programs to help them advance, and to select and groom the experienced non-commissioned officers who tie all this together. We invest months to years to decades into our best people.

By contrast, the Iraqi Army had &lt;b&gt;nothing&lt;/b&gt; five years ago. They literally didn&#039;t exist. They have to bootstrap the entire structure of a military.

Now our own military has done a remarkable job of filling in the gaps for them: protecting the people while they get on their feet, setting examples of how a professional military works, providing training and support and aid. We&#039;re giving them the chance.

And they have a training &quot;advantage&quot; that our academies and our bootcamps can&#039;t easily duplicate: when you train under fire, if you survive, you learn fast.

But to be where they are today from where they started five years ago is astonishing, pure and simple. If they can keep up this momentum, if we can help them long enough, they&#039;ll build to the point where they don&#039;t need our help any more.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>Poorly planned, not executed well â€¦ but <i>executed</i>, and ongoing.
</p></blockquote>
<p>Frankly, I&#8217;m astonished at how well the Iraqi Army is doing, and disgusted by the impossible standards their critics expect them to meet.</p>
<p>We have dedicated military academies to create junior officers who are ready to command basic operations. This within a well-established military culture and a structure all designed to help create seasoned officers while accomplishing missions. Parallel to this, we have bootcamp programs honed over centuries to prepare new recruits for the field, and other programs to help them advance, and to select and groom the experienced non-commissioned officers who tie all this together. We invest months to years to decades into our best people.</p>
<p>By contrast, the Iraqi Army had <b>nothing</b> five years ago. They literally didn&#8217;t exist. They have to bootstrap the entire structure of a military.</p>
<p>Now our own military has done a remarkable job of filling in the gaps for them: protecting the people while they get on their feet, setting examples of how a professional military works, providing training and support and aid. We&#8217;re giving them the chance.</p>
<p>And they have a training &#8220;advantage&#8221; that our academies and our bootcamps can&#8217;t easily duplicate: when you train under fire, if you survive, you learn fast.</p>
<p>But to be where they are today from where they started five years ago is astonishing, pure and simple. If they can keep up this momentum, if we can help them long enough, they&#8217;ll build to the point where they don&#8217;t need our help any more.</p>
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		<title>By: &#8220;How the media lost Basra&#8221; &#171; Crush Liberalism</title>
		<link>http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154270</link>
		<dc:creator>&#8220;How the media lost Basra&#8221; &#171; Crush Liberalism</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 12:18:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154270</guid>
		<description>[...] exposing the MSM for its agenda-based, fact-deprived, reality-denyingÂ advocacy journalism.Â  From Dean Esmay: Via Glenn, Ed Morissey notes that dextrospheric doubts about the Basra reporting have now been [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] exposing the MSM for its agenda-based, fact-deprived, reality-denyingÂ advocacy journalism.Â  From Dean Esmay: Via Glenn, Ed Morissey notes that dextrospheric doubts about the Basra reporting have now been [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Autorantic Moonbat Machine and Democratic Debate Reaction &#124; conservativeintelligencer.com</title>
		<link>http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154261</link>
		<dc:creator>Autorantic Moonbat Machine and Democratic Debate Reaction &#124; conservativeintelligencer.com</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 03:48:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154261</guid>
		<description>[...] How the Media lost in Basra. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] How the Media lost in Basra. [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: DPGI v.3 &#187; The Dominant Media rooting for the enemy and getting it WRONG</title>
		<link>http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154250</link>
		<dc:creator>DPGI v.3 &#187; The Dominant Media rooting for the enemy and getting it WRONG</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 00:06:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154250</guid>
		<description>[...] Via Dean&#8217;s World: How The Media Lost In Basra [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Via Dean&#8217;s World: How The Media Lost In Basra [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Time: Sadr won in Basra &#171; Internet Scofflaw</title>
		<link>http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154247</link>
		<dc:creator>Time: Sadr won in Basra &#171; Internet Scofflaw</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Apr 2008 21:36:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154247</guid>
		<description>[...] Price (he reads Time so you don&#8217;t have to) notices that Time&#8217;s reporting on Basra is radically different from everyone else&#8217;s. While most outlets recognize the recent fighting in Basra as a clear if blemished victory for [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Price (he reads Time so you don&#8217;t have to) notices that Time&#8217;s reporting on Basra is radically different from everyone else&#8217;s. While most outlets recognize the recent fighting in Basra as a clear if blemished victory for [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Snippet</title>
		<link>http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154243</link>
		<dc:creator>Snippet</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Apr 2008 21:11:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154243</guid>
		<description>Thanks Bill.

Good information.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks Bill.</p>
<p>Good information.</p>
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		<title>By: BillINDC</title>
		<link>http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154240</link>
		<dc:creator>BillINDC</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Apr 2008 20:37:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154240</guid>
		<description>Poorly planned, not executed well ... but &lt;i&gt;executed&lt;/i&gt;, and ongoing. A win for the Mahdi Army? No way.  In strategic/political context, the fact that the government moved to wrest the city away from the Mahdi Army and is having some success - despite some setbacks - is good news.

This is about the best take on it:

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/936meniz.asp?pg=1</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Poorly planned, not executed well &#8230; but <i>executed</i>, and ongoing. A win for the Mahdi Army? No way.  In strategic/political context, the fact that the government moved to wrest the city away from the Mahdi Army and is having some success &#8211; despite some setbacks &#8211; is good news.</p>
<p>This is about the best take on it:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/936meniz.asp?pg=1" rel="nofollow">http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/936meniz.asp?pg=1</a></p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Snippet</title>
		<link>http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154237</link>
		<dc:creator>Snippet</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Apr 2008 20:01:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154237</guid>
		<description>Bill,

Can you offer an informed take on the performance of the Iraqi Army in Basra from a realistic perspective?

I&#039;m having a tough time sorting it out.

It hardly seems like a cave-in, or the Sadrists wouldn&#039;t be hiding from them, but their performance does seem a bit dicey.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bill,</p>
<p>Can you offer an informed take on the performance of the Iraqi Army in Basra from a realistic perspective?</p>
<p>I&#8217;m having a tough time sorting it out.</p>
<p>It hardly seems like a cave-in, or the Sadrists wouldn&#8217;t be hiding from them, but their performance does seem a bit dicey.</p>
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		<title>By: BillINDC</title>
		<link>http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154225</link>
		<dc:creator>BillINDC</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Apr 2008 19:10:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://deanesmay.com/2008/04/16/how-the-media-lost-in-basra/#comment-154225</guid>
		<description>Exhibit B:

&quot;Cut and Run in Sadr City&quot;

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/world/middleeast/16sadr.html?_r=1&amp;ex=1365998400&amp;en=3508851cadc301a5&amp;ei=5088&amp;partner=rssnyt&amp;emc=rss&amp;oref=slogin

The missing context: Iraqi Army desertion rates in Baghdad and Basra are running about 3%. In contrast, US desertion rates in WWII were abut 6%.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Exhibit B:</p>
<p>&#8220;Cut and Run in Sadr City&#8221;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/world/middleeast/16sadr.html?_r=1&#038;ex=1365998400&#038;en=3508851cadc301a5&#038;ei=5088&#038;partner=rssnyt&#038;emc=rss&#038;oref=slogin" rel="nofollow">http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/world/middleeast/16sadr.html?_r=1&#038;ex=1365998400&#038;en=3508851cadc301a5&#038;ei=5088&#038;partner=rssnyt&#038;emc=rss&#038;oref=slogin</a></p>
<p>The missing context: Iraqi Army desertion rates in Baghdad and Basra are running about 3%. In contrast, US desertion rates in WWII were abut 6%.</p>
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