Both the left and the right are trying to make political hay over whether or not we should be holding high-level talks with everyone, no matter how repugnant we find their past behavior and current stated positions. Frankly, I find both the left’s position and the right’s position unreasonable here.
I’ve studied negotiation theory. Walking away from the negotiating table or refusing to sit down at the table in the first place is a well-known negotiation tactic. It’s a very aggressive tactic. Sometimes it’s appropriate, and sometimes it isn’t. It often makes sense when you suspect there isn’t any real middle ground to negotiate over (and thus talking is a waste of time), when the other side’s opening position is completely unreasonable and you want to call his bluff, when you have a very strong position which you want to exploit, and when you need to bluff that you have a very strong position. Whether it’s appropriate is a judgement call which needs to be made on a case-by-case basis.
A stated policy that you will sit down and talk with everyone without preconditions is foolishness, as you’re unilaterally renouncing a valuable negotiation tool. Likewise, categorical statements against negotiating with our enemies (or the enemies of our allies) are also foolishness because they tie our hands unnecessarily if we follow through and they diminish our credibility if we don’t. Categorical statements about certain circumstances in which we won’t negotiate can be valuable as part of a grim trigger strategy — we might make a policy that we’ll never negotiate with terrorists in order to reduce the temptation to use terrorism to extract concessions from us — but grim trigger is a brutal strategy which should be used sparingly because of the dreadful cost of following through, and because not following through destroys the credibility upon which it relies for its effectiveness.
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On the other hand, if one side is willing to walk away and the other isn’t, the side that is willing to walk away has all of the power in the negotiations. Obama has shown no intention of walking away from any negotiations, ever.
We are in a stronger position from the beginning on any negotiations. Our military insures that, and we paid and continue to pay a high price for that privilege.Â
Phelps’s last blog post..Handing it to McCain
It’s an interesting conundrum.
I’d highly recommend folks read the history of the Barbary Pirates. A good chaper is in the book "Power, Faith & Fantasy" by Michael Oren.
In a nutshell, not only did we negotiate and talk with terrorists, but back in the 1800′s — Muslim pirates would regularly high-jack US ships, kidnap the crew, and hold them for ransom, which we dutifully paid.
Prez Jefferson got so tired of this — he decided it was necessary to develop a Navy.
Bottom line: There is no hard and fast principle on when or whether to talk to bad guys. Sometimes, you have to, sometimes you have to do it openly, sometimes you have to do it covertly. Sometimes, you simply say No.
In this case, we should not talk to Iran, without serious pre-conditions.  A buncha deluded, Theocratic thugs run that country. They are irrational. Talk does not impress them, only action does.
HB
We are in a stronger position from the beginning on any negotiations. Our military insures that, and we paid and continue to pay a high price for that privilege.
It’s true that our military gives us a huge advantage in diplomacy, but it’s not the whole story. Especially in recent decades, we’ve been reluctant to use our military and very quick to retreat when using our military fails to produce immediate and total victory. The Iraq war has been an exception, but only barely so considering how loud the calls for withdrawl have gotten and how quickly they started.
A buncha deluded, Theocratic thugs run that country. They are irrational. Talk does not impress them, only action does.
Perhaps. I suspect they’re coldly and rationally calculating exactly how crazy they can act (which benefits them by making them look strong and by encouraging others to tread lightly around them) without provoking a response from us. But in either case, refusing to negotiate until they show signs of starting to act reasonably is a defensible course of action.
I think you’re right, in so far as a universal application of either principle is a bad idea.
I also think that the question of what to do about Iran is incredibly complicated. I back Obama’s approach because clearly Bush’s has failed to show results. How long does this failure have to continue before we consider it conclusively a failure? Do we want Iran to be another Cuba, which we haven’t been communicating with in 50 years, and who has gotten on just fine by just ignoring the U.S. and doing it’s own thing?
Or maybe we can stop worrying about granting them the legitimacy they already have, whether we like it or not, and open a constructive dialog. Maybe if they feel that the west isn’t completely disrespecting them at every turn, they’ll be willing to give some concessions. They’ve offered them before:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/18/AR2007011801273.html
And Cheney turned them down due to their crazy "we don’t talk to evil" doctrine.
HeruFeanor (what an odd name)…
The State Dept. disputes Wilkerson’s claim that there was a letter  - and Wilkerson does seem to be the type with an ax to grind with the Admin. Got any proof that there was such a letter?
And Cheney turned them down due to their crazy "we don’t talk to evil" doctrine.
Without knowing the details of the offer, it’s hard to say whether it would have been a good deal for us or not. I probably would have at least made a counteroffer in Bush’s place, but it’s quite possible that no deal would have come out of it.
Specifically, the article says "end its military support for Hezbollah and Hamas", which implies that financial support would continue, and "help the United States stabilize Iraq" might very well involve a veiled demand for unacceptable political concessions in Iraq (such as a free hand for Iranian-backed militias in Shiite areas). " Increase the transparency of its nuclear program" could be very significant or completely worthless depending on the details.
Given that they were asking for a complete lifting of sanctions and our active support in getting rid of Iranian opposition groups outside Iran (our only sticks in negotiations with them short of threatening war), I can see how rejecting their offer might have been the best course of action depending on the details of the offer.
How long does this failure have to continue before we consider it conclusively a failure?
I’m not sure. I hear that 12 years was too fast to give up on dealing with Saddam through sanctions and containment.
Snark aside, I’m not sure that simply stalling Iran over the last few years should be considered a categorical failure. If and when Iraq stablizes to the point that we don’t need to tie up almost all of our deployable military there, our negotiating position with Iran improves considerably. By stalling for several years, it’s very likely we’d be able to negotiate a better deal in 2009 or 2010Â than we could have in 2003-2008.
To Scott Kirwin:
(The name is a reference to the Silmarillion. Blame Tolkein. :-) )
And I suppose it’s true that this letter is a he-said/she-said situation. The only real evidence is the character of the two.
In general, I don’t trust the current administration as far as I can throw them, and Dick Cheney alone is probably more then I could lift, let alone throw.
Wilkerson has a history of criticizing the Bush administration, and most of it seems pretty valid. He doesn’t have any significant history of dishonesty, though not all of his claims can be checked.
So, I tend to believe Wilkerson, but you’re right, it’s hardly conclusive.
Maniakes…does our negotiating position still improve considerably if Iran obtains nuclear weapons (and possibly also a ballistic- or cruise-missile delivery system) during that interval?
To Maniakes:
That was the first article I found on it, and it offers less detail then I remember seeing the last time I looked. I’m looking for other versions that give more info now.
The BBC version is somewhat better: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6274147.stm
There are circumstances where refusing to talk to someone is a good negotiating tactic, but they are few and far between. It is usually when you have been negotiating for a long time with no resolution. Both sides understand the other sides position. Further negotiations are pointless until someone is willing to change position.
That is hardly the case with Iran or Syria.
No, of course not. And since I don’t have access to detailed intelligence reports on the progress Iran’s nuclear program, and publicly available analyses vary wildly, I have no idea how likely Iran is to develop nukes in the next year or two.
To Maniakes:
That was just the first version of the report that I found. See the BBC version of the article for some more details.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6274147.stm
As to attacking Iraq, I think the standard should be somewhat higher for when military power is warranted then for when high-level negotiations are warranted. Very few people are seriously proposing attacking Iran. (Though I suspect you already know this, considering you admitted that was snark.)
As to what we’ve accomplished, have we really been stalling Iran, or has Iran been stalling us? Remember, in the short-term picture, we want something out of them (stop building nukes, stop inciting violence in the region), but they don’t really want anything out of us except to get out of their hair so they can get on with the building of the nukes and the inciting of violence. As such, they are the ones that really benefit from stalling.
Mikeca, we have been negotiating for a long time with Iran and Syria. The negotiations have been taking place by public posturing, by low-level diplomatic dialogs, and by unofficial back-channel discussions. We know what their position is, and they know what ours is.
By placing preconditions of official high-level face-to-face talks, we’re using our agreement to those talks (with the implied promise that we’d be willing to make concessions in those talks) as a bargaining chip to get Iran and Syria to bring their opening negotiating positions close to a position we’d be willing to agree to.
Talk, certainly. Without pre-conditions? Well, at a low level, or "back channel" yes.Â
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Has anyone actually read the interview that started this firestorm? It would seem that BHO and his much-maligned (by him…) staff have not. The "without preconditions" phrase was part of a long and overly-complex question, easily overlooked (I had to read it twice) and NOT something O’Horror said. But being as usual easily distracted and offended, his output has been to defend his saying something he did not actually say.Â
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This is something not worthy of a block captain, let alone a Presidential candidate.
Remember, in the short-term picture, we want something out of them (stop building nukes, stop inciting violence in the region), but they don’t really want anything out of us except to get out of their hair so they can get on with the building of the nukes and the inciting of violence.
Based on your assessment, there doesn’t sound like there’s anything that high-level negotiations could accomplish because Iran prefers their BATNA (best alternative to negotiated agreement) to anything we could reasonably offer them. That’s a textbook example of a situation where negotiations are a waste of everyone’s time.
If that’s true (and I suspect it may be), the only way to alter the situation so a deal is possible is to make their BATNA worse. In this case, that probably means credibly threatening military action (which could take the form of strategic bombing and a naval blockade even if an invasion would be impractical).
The Bush strategy has been to take very moderate actions to make Iran’s BATNA worse (talking tough about military options being on the table, refusing to deal with Iran directly, and negotiating with Europe and Russia to try to increase Iran’s diplomatic and economic isolation) without actually taking military action or painting himself into a corner where we’d be forced either to go to war or lose our ability to credibly threaten war. So far, this has failed to produce an agreement, but it may have had success in keeping Iran from being more blatant and aggressive in the behaviors we’re trying to discourage.
teqjack:
I just tracked down a transcript, here:
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/07/23/debate.transcript/
The "without precondition" seemed to stand out pretty strongly to me. Maybe it was a bit less so in the video (which I can’t watch right now). However, also consider that he followed it up with:
"Now, Ronald Reagan and Democratic presidents like JFK constantly spoke to Soviet Union at a time when Ronald Reagan called them an evil empire. And the reason is because they understood that we may not trust them and they may pose an extraordinary danger to this country, but we had the obligation to find areas where we can potentially move forward."
So, I think he fully understood the question, or at least, he understood it in the same light that I understood it. Which is to say, he won’t place conditions upon them before he speaks with them. He won’t require them to change their behavior first, and then talk afterwards. This does not mean that there won’t be a great deal of preparatory work, a lot of back-channel diplomacy, before the high level meetings actually occur.
"As such, they are the ones that really benefit from stalling."
We aren’t stalling. We’re acting diplomatically by refusing to reward Iran’s continued bad faith with a huge increase their international prestige. That was never a factor with the USSR.
And right now Iran wants nothing more than international prestige, as embodied in the implication that they are on equal terms with the United States and other western powers. With other nuclear powers. That alone would be a tremendous diplomatic and publicity coup for Iran. It wouldn’t matter what actually happens in the negotiations because they’d already would have been given what they came for.
Those two items, stopping nuclear development and stop meddling in Iraq, are non-negotiable demands. And while I don’t forsee a full-fledged invasion of Iran (or Syria) anytime in the near future, Iranian nuclear capability is a threat that cannot be allowed to exist. Either we’d take care of it or Israel would, with or without our help.
bcostin’s last blog post..A sweet deal if you can get it.
Based on your assessment, there doesn’t sound like there’s anything that high-level negotiations could accomplish because Iran prefers their BATNA (best alternative to negotiated agreement) to anything we could reasonably offer them. That’s a textbook example of a situation where negotiations are a waste of everyone’s time.
I should clarify: There are things we could offer, or they wouldn’t have had any demands to make in the offer I quoted earlier.
I honestly thing Iran’s ultimate goal is to be respected as an international power, and they really believe that the only way to garner that respect is to have nuclear weapons. Iran is like a gangsta trying to get a gun, because he’s convinced that if he has a gun, he’ll have respect. The trick, then, is to teach them how to get respect by means other then weaponry.
This is why Obama’s path makes sense to me. Iran needs to be talked out of pointing a gun at Israel, and they need to be talked out of it before they GET the gun, or it may be too late. Refusing to talk to them isn’t going to accomplish anything, and actual military action needs to be a last resort, the action we take when they’re about to point the gun and they’ve removed all our other options.
John Bolton has an excellent column on this at the Wall Street Journal. Excerpt:
Legitimacy and international acceptability are qualities terrorists crave, and should therefore not be conferred casually, if at all.
Moreover, negotiations – especially those "without precondition" as Mr. Obama has specifically advocated – consume time, another precious asset that terrorists and rogue leaders prize. Here, President Bush’s reference to Hitler was particularly apt: While the diplomats of European democracies played with their umbrellas, the Nazis were rearming and expanding their industrial power.
…
Iran has conclusively proven how to use negotiations to this end. After five years of negotiations with the Europeans, with the Bush administration’s approbation throughout, the only result is that Iran is five years closer to having nuclear weapons. North Korea has also used the Six-Party Talks to gain time, testing its first nuclear weapon in 2006, all the while cloning its Yongbyon reactor in the Syrian desert.
Read the whole thing.
How would you have Iran become respected as an international power without getting nukes, supporting terrorists, or otherwise making trouble in the region? The only possibility that leaps to my mind would be liberalizing and becoming a shining beacon of freedom and prosperity, but I don’t see the Mullahs going for that because to liberalize would be to kick away the ladder that put them where they are, while they’re still standing on it.
Military action needs to be an option on the table because Iran is actively supporting and encouraging terrorist groups that attack us and our allies, and they may be trying to get nuclear weapons as a gun to point as us or at Israel. This is not acceptable behavior — by the traditional rules of international relations, the former is an act of war. To get them to stop, we can either bribe them or threaten them. Threatening them does not strike me as inherently unreasonable under the circumstances. Bribing them may turn out to be necessary, but it’s dangerous because it sets an example that you can get major concessions from the US by misbehaving.
Iran isn’t the only one Obama wants to negotiate. There’s also Kim Jong-Il.
I have to ask, what’s the point of negotiating with someone who does so in bad faith? I don’t see how any good could possibly come of that.
Of course we need the threat of military action. The question is, how do you phrase the threat? Is it "Stop now or we’ll attack"? Or is it "If you develop nuclear weapons, we’ll be forced to attack"?
And there is a third route to international respect: Great wealth. They have the money, at least potentially. The only thing that’s keeping them from using it effectively is that they’re consistently offending the international community. All they really need to do is stop developing nukes and inciting violence, and then they’d have a free hand to sell their oil, build their wealth, and invest it internationally to build the same sort of financial empire the Saudis have. Then, like Saudi Arabia, they can be a powerful and generally respected country, without having to really liberalize and become a "western"-style government.
Not that I exactly like Saudi Arabia, mind you, but they’re a far cry better then Iran, and I would therefore be stoked if Iran decided to follow the Saudi model.
Mark
Thanks for the Bolton link. I’m a big fan of his.
I agree Iran would be a lot wealthier if its rulers were focused on wealth instead of power. I’d certainly prefer that.
That’s not reality, though.
Apparently they calculate their self-interest differently than you or I would.
I suspect Iran has decided that they like their chances at pursuing regional hegemony better than the Saudi route, as they could start pursuing the Saudi path tomorrow. Libya started down that path in 2003Â by dismantling their WMD programs, renouncing terrorism, and paying reparations for past Libyan attacks against the west. In return, we’ve restored normal diplomatic relations, ended sanctions, and removed them from the list of terrorism-supporting states.
I suspect Libya made that decision based on a combination of fatigue from a decade of sanctions and diplomatic isolation, and the implied threat of military action after we’d demonstrated in Iraq that we were willing to go to war over WMD and support for terrorists. As far as I can tell, Bush is trying essentially the same tactics against Iran that succeeded with Libya – maintaining sanctions, building an international concensus for diplomatic isolation, implying that the military option is on the table if we feel sufficiently threatened, and (presumably) keeping to door open for back-channel diplomacy if they decide to change course to a Saudi-style strategy.
And there is a third route to international respect: Great wealth. They have the money, at least potentially. The only thing that’s keeping them from using it effectively is that they’re consistently offending the international community. All they really need to do is stop developing nukes and inciting violence, and then they’d have a free hand to sell their oil, build their wealth, and invest it internationally to build the same sort of financial empire the Saudis have.
You make a strong case there that diplomatic negotiations are unnecessary. That is to say, our best offer is already on the table, and in some ways even independent of our actions. They can accept the offer at any time, but choose not to.
Yes, this offer has been on the table for a long time. I’m not so much thinking that the offer itself will change, so much as the presentation of the offer will change. We don’t need to offer them more or bigger concessions, we need to show them why the offer they’re getting is actually a good deal for them. And I’m honestly convinced it IS a good deal for them.
A huge part of good diplomacy is not just manipulating the components of the offer, but also convincing them that the offer is a good deal for them. It’s salesmanship. Thus far, we’ve failed to sell Iran on these conditions, but I think we’ve been giving them a rather poor pitch. I think what Obama is really offering is to pitch the offer to them differently.
Most of the concessions he’s offering with membership in international organizations and treaties are things that would potentially be open to them ANYWAY if they were to clean up their act, so I don’t really see these as significant concessions. I merely see them as bringing to the forefront some of the advantages of stepping back in line with the international community.
I don’t think it’d necessarily be a bad thing for the next president to have a face-to-face talk with Iran’s leaders to explain to them that the Saudi/Libyan option is their best hope and that we’d be prepared to go to war if they continue on their present course, provided we were willing to walk out if they said no and provided that we were willing to follow through on our threats if necessary.
That’s why I think the right is being silly by saying it’d be a terrible thing to talk to the Iranians. I doubt much would come of it because I think we’re sending pretty much the same message through other channels, but I also doubt it’d do much harm.
Where I think the left is being silly is the attempt to make never breaking off negotiations into a high moral principle. If you’re committed to coming to a deal at any costs, then they’ve got you over a barrel.
I think it’s worth noting that Obama never said (at least, anywhere that I’m aware of) that military action was completely out of the question, nor that we couldn’t walk away from the table if it became clear that we couldn’t reach a deal. He merely pledged to engage in high level talks without precondition. Continuing those talks past a certain point would obviously have conditions.
Good exposition, Maniakes, and one with which I’m in complete agreement. I’m becoming downright fond of you.
One more point:Â grim trigger is a lousy, risky strategy.
I’m glad to hear it, Dave. Thank you.
Maniakes
I second Dave. This is a very well balanced essay (and discussion).
Thank you, too, Scott.
I also want to thank HeruFeanor for sticking around to defend the moderate-liberal viewpoint, which went a long way towards keeping the discussion balanced.
I find the Obama position — "talk without preconditions" — more palatable than the "we don’t talk to our enemies. Period" line. Two reasons:
First, the offer to talk is merely an offer. It can be rescinded at nearly any time and for any reason. Don’t like the color jacket Ahmadinejad is wearing? Meeting’s off! Don’t like the recent imprisonment of journalists? Meeting’s off! Upset that Ahmadinejad criticized David Hasselhoff? Meeting’s off (Especially if you’re German)!
Second, it’s a useful gambit to throw at your rivals if you think they’re going to turn you down. "Hi, I’m reasonable. Too bad you’re not!" And if they do call your bluff … well, sitting through a few days of painfully awkward meetings is a small price to pay to show that you can be reasonable.
It’s also worth remembering that talking to somebody is not the same as agreeing with that person. And it’s also worth remembering that entering negotiations is not the same thing as giving away the silverware.
–|PW|–
One more thought:
Let’s not forget that the fine art of diplomatic doublespeak has a place, too. Obama’s high-flying rhetoric worries me sometimes in the same way that Bush’s plain-talking persona did back in 2000. I come away convinced that neither recognizes the place for finesse and nuance in presidential pronouncements.
–|PW|–
The key word in negotiation is “leverage.” Negotiation is a skill, but bad negotiators with leverage will usually beat good negotiators without leverage. Leverage involves willingness, among other things.
I don’t mind meeting with enemies or other folks as an information-gathering tool — what’s there problem, what do they want, what leverage do they have.
As long as countries like Iran have the extreme form of leverage over us in the form of oil, we’re in a weak negotiating position by nature. Pretty talk won’t change that.
All they really need to do is stop developing nukes and inciting violence, and then they’d have a free hand to sell their oil, build their wealth, and invest it internationally to build the same sort of financial empire the Saudis have. Then, like Saudi Arabia, they can be a powerful and generally respected country, without having to really liberalize and become a "western"-style government.
Not that I exactly like Saudi Arabia, mind you, but they’re a far cry better then Iran, and I would therefore be stoked if Iran decided to follow the Saudi model.
Saudi Arabia paid for and inspired 9/11. After 9/11, 95% of educated Saudis said that they supported bin Ladens goals.
During the Iraq war, the Saudi chief justice demanded that young Saudis should go to Iraq and fight the Americans. The majority of suicide bombers in Iraq were, and are, Saudis. Al Qaeda is, basically, the Saudi army. They fight abroad, no coups at home, please.
Saudi Arabia is also planning to develop nukes, with Bush and Cheney’s help.
Saudi Arabia is the hub of world terrorism. Stuart Levey, the US Treasury official in charge of tracking terror financing, said of Saudi Arabia:
“If I could somehow snap my fingers and cut off the funding from one country, it would be Saudi Arabia,â€
Saudi Arabia also doesn’t have as much oil as they claimed to have. We’re kissing the butts of the people who are responsible for the deaths of thousands of Americans on 9/11, we’re giving them nukes and we’re getting absolutely nothing in return.
It would probably be a bad idea to encourage other rabid nations to follow the Saudi model.
It would probably be a bad idea to encourage other rabid nations to follow the Saudi model.
You’re right. Saudi Arabia isn’t a good example of a domestically oppressive but wealthy and internationally well-behaved nation. Libya’s probably the best example, now; as far as I know they’ve kept their noses clean since the 2003 deal.
While I think Our Good Friends the Saudis are poorly behaved, I don’t think they’re as bad as you think they are. My understanding of Saudi support for terrorism is that it’s not official government policy like Iranian or Syrian support for terrorism, or even deniable black ops, but rather the government teaches a radical theology which is shared by Al Qaeda, and the government has failed to suppress terror-supporting activities by Saudi citizens.
Saudi Arabia is also planning to develop nukes, with Bush and Cheney’s help.
My understanding of that is that we’re building them nuclear reactors, which presumably will be operated under IAEA anti-proliferation procedures. I’ve heard nothing about the Saudis seeking nuclear weapons.
We heard nothing about the Pakistanis seeking nuclear weapons either. Guess who financed their efforts…
From Global Security:
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have concluded a secret agreement on "nuclear cooperation" that will provide the Saudis with nuclear-weapons technology in exchange for cheap oil, according to a ranking Pakistani insider.
The disclosure came at the end of a 26-hour state visit to Islamabad last weekend by Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, who flew across the Arabian Sea with an entourage of 200, including Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal and several Cabinet ministers.
Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the pro-American defense minister who is next in line to the throne after the crown prince, was not part of the delegation.
"It will be vehemently denied by both countries," said the Pakistani source, whose information has proven reliable for more than a decade, "but future events will confirm that Pakistan has agreed to provide [Saudi Arabia] with the wherewithal for a nuclear deterrent."
Saudi Arabia also vehemently denies that they support terrorism, even after Prince Bandar threatened Tony Blair with al Qaeda terrorist attacks.
Is Iranian and Syrian support of terror ‘official’ policy?
From Global Security: [...]
I stand corrected.
Is Iranian and Syrian support of terror ‘official’ policy?
I’m pretty sure Iranian and Syrian support at least for Hizballah is official.
Most people who read my comments are aware that I always favor a policy of armed force against any threat, rather than negotiation, so long as the threatening party lacks our overall position of power.
This means that I first would flatten Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
At the same time, if possible, I would send in a team of trained and pre-positioned killers to assassinate their leader Achmedinajad; either up close and personal, or remotely by waiting until he is aboard an aircraft, then use this country’s vast missile capabilities to destroy that aircraft in flight.
(That was exactly the way the US Army Air Force in 1943 was used to kill of the commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. That project, carefully arranged by a US naval intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet, was code named "Dillinger".)
Yes, that in fact is my idea of the way diplomacy should work when dealing with international gangsters. the applicable policy for national power is "use it or lose it".
No, I never lose any sleep at night over anything, and I have no sympathy for losers.
Arnold Harris
Mount Horeb WI
Â
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