The brilliant Penn Jillette makes a living from being a skeptic. Skepticism, he reports in the LA Times, isn’t good enough for the “reality based community,” however — not on matters central to the canon:
[S]omeone asked us about global warming, or climate change, or however they’re branding it now. Teller and I were both silent on stage for a bit too long, and then I said I didn’t know.
I elaborated on “I don’t know†quite a bit. I said that Al Gore was so annoying (that’s scientifically provable, right?) that I really wanted to doubt anything he was hyping, but I just didn’t know. I also emphasized that really smart friends, who knew a lot more than me, were convinced of global warming. I ended my long-winded rambling (I most often have a silent partner) very clearly with “I don’t know.†I did that because … I don’t know. . . .
The next day, I heard that one of the non-famous, non-groovy, non-scientist speakers had used me as an example of someone who let his emotions make him believe things that are wrong. . . . Later, I was asked about a Newsweek blog she wrote. . . . She ends with: “But here was Penn, a great friend to the skeptic community, basically saying, ‘Don’t bother me with scientific evidence, I’m going to make up my mind about global warming based on my disdain for Al Gore.’ … Which just goes to show, not even the most hard-nosed empiricists and skeptics are immune from the power of emotion to make us believe stupid things.â€Is there no ignorance allowed on this one subject? . . . You can’t turn on the TV without seeing someone hating ourselves for what we’ve done to the planet and preaching the end of the world. Maybe they’re right, but is there no room for “maybeâ€? There’s a lot of evidence, but global warming encompasses a lot of complicated points: Is it happening? Did we cause it? Is it bad? Can we fix it? Is government-forced conservation the only way to fix it? . . .
[T]he climate of the whole world is . . . complicated. I’m not a scientist, and I haven’t spent my life studying weather. I’m trying to learn what I can, and while I’m working on it, isn’t it OK to say “I don’t know�
Skepticism has been turned on its head; doubt becomes a thought crime. What is it called when that happens, exactly? I have always liked this guy.
I can’t give Jillette all the credit in the world for this thinking, however. His skeptical principles of knowing when not to know only go so far. Perhaps it really does matter whose ox is being Gored, because when it comes to other important matters arguably at least as complicated as global warming, Jillette is bold in his ignorance when in, fact, being so makes him feel good. Read the rest of this entry >>
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I have found that a whole lot of so-called "skeptics" really aren’t skeptical of anything much if it comes from scientific consensus. I’ve seen it time and again, on multiple subjects. This is absurd, for while it may be true that the scientific consensus is correct more often than it’s not, it is not correct to state that it’s overwhelmingly correct almost all of the time, when any fool who’s been following the sciences for more than, oh, say, a decade or so knows that what we "know" to be true changes, and new theories and hypotheses cause old ones to be thrown out all the time. I have seen precious little evidence that the problems of hidebound thinking, ego, subjectivity, wishful thinking, and all the other things that empiricism is supposed to help us get around have gone away in our modern age or are any better than they were hundreds of years ago–which is why the scientific method, as limited as it is, has shown itself to be so extremely useful. Too bad more people who claim to believe in the sciences apparently don’t understand either it or its limits.
Well, yes, but here Jillette departs from that consensus, and bravely too, but guess what? It’s just as likely because, as I argue after the break, he’s evidently a kind of libertarian, as because he’s so much of the skeptic as he suggests.
Ron Coleman’s last blog post..When ?I don’t know? is heresy? and when it’s not
He and his partner Teller are unabashed self-described libertarian atheists. They make no bones about it, they are proud of it.
Jillette goes so far in his atheism that he actually forbids religious people from bringing religious objects or discussions into his home, even when it’s visiting friends. He compares it to liquor (he doesn’t drink at all) and smoking (he never smokes): he just doesn’t want his kids exposed to such things, which he considers pernicious.
I’m probably making him sound more obnoxious than he is about it; he actually does a pretty good job of being charming and funny when he says these things. But there’s no question, he’s not even a little atheist, he’s WAY atheist.
I would expect him to get in trouble among righties for his stance on sex and moral issues (he’s highly libertarian there too), but for lefties to find themselves utterly shocked and appalled that such a reasoned, rational man that they like so much rejects some of their own beloved articles of faith. Oh, and did I mention that he’s a *huge* gun nut and lover of the 2nd amendment? I wouldn’t be surprised if the lady who penned the outraged column would fall into a horrible case of the vapors if she heard that, too…
"But there’s no question, he’s not even a little atheist, he’s WAY atheist."
Sounds to me like he’s simply way anti-religious. Â I’m not sure how one could be any more "way" atheist than someone could be "way" not a fork.
Bad’s last blog post..Blog Shorts: Bush Smears Jefferson, Colson Smears Atheists, Cthulhu Smears Your Entrails Across Campaign Trail
My experience as an ex-atheist is that there are basically two types of atheists, people who are obnoxious and aggressive and condescending about it and people who are not.
Besides, just turn your argument on its head: isn’t someone either religious or not religious? Or are some people way more religious than others?
"My experience as an ex-atheist is that there are basically two types of atheists, people who are obnoxious and aggressive and condescending about it and people who are not."And How many types of every other group are there?"Besides, just turn your argument on its head: isn’t someone either religious or not religious? Or are some people way more religious than others?"You can’t turn the lack of something "on its head."
 Of course you can be religious to a greater or lesser extent.  And you can also be anti-religious to a greater or lesser extent.  But you can’t be not religious, or not theistic, to a greater or lesser extent.  Either you are or you aren’t.  Everything else is yourself, or an attitude towards religion/theism.
Bad’s last blog post..Blog Shorts: Bush Smears Jefferson, Colson Smears Atheists, Cthulhu Smears Your Entrails Across Campaign Trail
Seems like a pointless semantics argument to me. There’s a difference between simply not believing something and passionately not-believing as a cause unto itself. You can decide what way of describing it you feel most comfortable with. Me? I’d say the guy who sent me a tract he wrote that was about how the world would be a much better place if we’d all be atheists (I think he called it “A Brighter Future”) was a lot more atheist than you.
While I’m at it I might as well also mention the example of Communists, who titularly supported religion and made some nods toward "liberation theology" but were and are almost invariably officially atheist and practiced widespread harassment and oppression against those of faith, believing it to ultimately be a case of "false consciousness" and reactionary against the revolution.
I suppose if you look at this mathematically, and belief is either 0 or 1, none of this makes sense, but human language isn’t generally mathematical.
Semantics and confusion about the underlying concepts are two different things. The issue is trying to apply affirmative logic to a privative definition. One’s degree of belief in a proposition or cause is not at all binary, I agree. But lack of belief has no gradients. Lack of belief is the 0.
Communists were indeed anti-religion, as was your tract-writing acquaintance, and they had all sorts of opinions about religion, as do I. But saying that they were not more or less atheist than anyone else gives a false impression that lack of belief is itself some sort of affirmative position in common.Â
I would love it if the debate over "atheism" was merely semantic, and I’d be happy to use any other word people like (non-theist is great, I think). But unfortunately, the inconsistent way that people employ the term "atheist" tends to lead to a lot of false impressions that we can’t avoid dealing with if we’re going to consider these matters fairly.
It is, I would say, an unavoidable reality that if you take a position, rarely do you take an absolute yes or no; the level of firmness with which you hold a conviction inevitably leads to certain attitudes and certain conclusions. Therefore, I would say that theism is not a 0 or 1 proposition.
Thus this is a semantical argument so far as I can see. You want me to grant that atheism is merely the absence of something. I do not agree. It is an affirmatively existing opinion.
"Therefore, I would say that theism is not a 0 or 1 proposition."
And I agree. One can be, for instance, an agnostic theist, or a theist disinterested in theism.
"Thus this is a semantical argument so far as I can see. You want me to grant that atheism is merely the absence of something. I do not agree. It is an affirmatively existing opinion."
Semantical arguments by definition cannot be over underlying issues of substance: if you disagree about something, then this is incompatible with it being merely semantical. Â
I’m not sure exactly what you are arguing though.
Are you saying that not believing in something is an affirmative opinion? I don’t see how you are justifying that claim, as far as I can tell, its a self-contradiction in terms and incompatible with doxastic logic. Â
Or are you simply insisting that "atheist" means only, and nothing less than, the strong claim that no gods exist? As I noted to Ron, that’s a common assertion made by theists, but very often they themselves, including Ron, don’t actually use the word that way. Ron was willing to call me an atheist based on me not believing in a god, for instance.Â
This sort of inconsistent usage is, I worry, almost designed to be confusing, especially given that so many atheists use the broader definition, and so, when criticized as atheists, are having their own meaning switched around: which is a semantical problem.  But a quite serious one, because it lends itself so easily to equivocation. And that is no mere difference of opinion: it a means of doing rhetorical wrong.
Athiest: someone who believes you can prove that G-d doesn’t exist.
Way Athiest: someone who says G-d doesn’t exist because he is angry at G-d.Â
So what if you don’t believe in a G-d, but also realize that science cannot prove or disprove the existence of such a being because it is a discipline derived from the observation of physical matter, or the mathematical prediction of forces or constructs?
There’s lots of reasons for people not to believe in G-d and as such it is not truly a religion, although some have made it a zealous philosophy of sorts.
"So what if you don’t believe in a G-d, but also realize that science cannot prove or disprove the existence of such a being because it is a discipline derived from the observation of physical matter, or the mathematical prediction of forces or constructs?"
"So what" is right.  It’s true that empiricism can’t answer questions well outside its limits. But the fact that one method of discerning truth from falsehood can’t answer a question does not then automatically legitimize alternative methods.  They have to be justified on their own terms before one can take them seriously. Otherwise, we’re left without reasons to believe.
Just because your car can’t drive on the open sea doesn’t mean that you necessarily have a working boat to sail on it.
Bad’s last blog post..Defending Obama’s ?Faith-Based? Funding Changes: Special Rules for the Religious?
It’s true that empiricism can’t answer questions well outside its limits. But the fact that one method of discerning truth from falsehood can’t answer a question does not then automatically legitimize alternative methods.  They have to be justified on their own terms before one can take them seriously.
Right but there are people who swear that science will prove that negative for them. Simply saying that, "I believe there is no G-d" is honestly more astute than saying that science proves there is no G-d.
However separating truth from falsehood has generally been attempted by philosophy rather than science. We have philosophy to bicker over what is truthful and what is not based on a set of rules that are logical but not necessarily empirical.
For example the statement is true, but obviously not empirical: If nickleypoops are wergitysmargs, and some wergitysmargs are fargelyjigs, then some nickleypoops are fargelyjigs.
Now, we have some sort of argument that some nickleypoops are fargelyjigs but these are imaginary constructs. Arguing the existence of a non-empirical object is indeed arguing over an imaginary construct until empirical evidence is found of such a being.
The same thing holds sway for the concept of a planet that holds life. We search for planets that can support life that resides here because we are under the strong philosophy that if there are so many planets and stars in the universe, then surely there must be another life-supporting planet. It seems logical but is certainly not empirical.
The problem with philosophy is that people have different definitions of truth and truth is relative (which is in and of itself a philosophy see how fun this gets?). Some people really like Ayn Rand and objectivism. Others think she is a selfish bitch can’t stand her and her philosophy. As long as either person has arguments that to not contradict and hold to the rules that bind a statement to true instead of false then they are being truthful from a philosophical standpoint. This does not mean any of these arguments apply to the physical world around us.
In fact there are many philosophies that describe what they physical world around us truly is, are you a materialist, or an idealist? Perhaps the ideas of monotheism and Xenophanes are more appropriate to your religion? In the end it boils down to philosophy. Aristotle’s scientific method even lists Metaphysics as a theoretical science. The scientific method scientists refer to today obviously has been refined over the years to include the empirical and exclude the metaphysical thus separating itself from the philosophical realm.
So yes, "I believe there is no god" is probably a more astute statement than, ‘There is no proof of a god."
"Right but there are people who swear that science will prove that negative for them. Simply saying that, "I believe there is no G-d" is honestly more astute than saying that science proves there is no G-d."
Certainly. And indeed, both are unecessary. It’s not until we have some agreement on a standard of truth, and then some evidence that a certain supernatural claim meets it, that we have something to work with. Until that point, simple lack of belief is all that’s necessary. And with most supernatural claims, they are so infinitely flexible from the perspective of everyday reality and meaning, that believing that there are no gods is nigh unintelligible on top of being impossible to support.
As I’ve pointed out, empiricism has the advantage of being very naturally built on the very same foundation as our common reality itself: we by and large can’t really avoid it. No such conditions attach to theistic assumptions, which anyone can take or leave as better or worse than any other without impeiriling any principle necessary for the argument to be had at all.
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