Obama’s economic advisors have published estimates of the multipliers for fiscal stimulus, stating that $1 in new spending will raise GDP by $1.57, while $1 in tax cuts will raise GDP by only $0.99.
Greg Mankiw argues that economic research, including research done by Christina Romer (chair of Obama’s council of economic advisors), argues for a much lower multiplier for spending-based stimulus and for a much higher multiplier for tax cuts.
Nate Silver accuses Mankiw of deliberately misinterpreting Romer’s research, applying conclusions based on a study specifically on one type of tax cut to examine the effects of a different type of tax cut. Mankiw responds by arguing that Romer studied that type of tax cut because it’s easier to study, not because there’s reason to believe it behaves differently than other tax cuts, and Silver expands his argument in more detail (continuing to argue that Mankiw misinterprets Romer, while thankfully appearing to drop the accusation that the misinterpretation is deliberate).
Also responding to Mankiw’s original argument, David Henderson links to his own editorial examining the implications of Romer’s research, which he believes he has studied in more depth than Mankiw (and presumably Silver as well). Henderson’s read on Romer’s work is that it rejects not just tax cuts as a form of fiscal stimulus, but rather it rejects fiscal stimulus of all forms.
The money quote from Silver’s posts is:
So Romer and Romer identify two types of exogenous tax shocks, one associated with a larger-than-conventionally-assumed multiplier, and the other associated with a smaller-than-conventionally-assumed multiplier — perhaps even one in which the sign is reversed. In considering a third type of tax cut, an “endogenous” tax cut designed to stimulate growth during a recession, what basis does Mankiw to assume that it will behave more like the former than the latter?
Henderson’s article , although not responding specifically to Silver’s posts (indeed, Henderson wrote his article well before Silver wrote his), contains a response to this complaint.
One big problem with the Romers’ research, which they acknowledge, is that in their model one tax cut of a given magnitude is identical to another tax cut of the same magnitude. It doesn’t matter, in their model, whether the tax cut comes from a tax credit or from a cut in marginal tax rates. But, of course, it does matter.
The three types of tax changes Romer examine and to which Silver alludes are:
- Tax cuts intended to support long-term economic growth. These cuts usually take the form of broad permanent reductions in tax rates, often with a focus on reducing taxes on savings and investment. It is these tax cuts that raise GDP by about $3 for every dollar of lost government revenue.
- Tax increases intended to reduce deficits. These increases are usually a combination of raising tax rates and reducing or eliminating deductions and credits (closing loopholes). It is these tax increase which Romer finds have a lower-than-previously-thought effect on GDP.
- Tax cuts to stimulate the economy in a recession and tax increases to prevent inflation during a boom. Tax increase to prevent inflation have only been put into effect once and are based on a now-long-discredited theory of what causes inflation. Tax cuts to stimulate the economy out of recession are much more common and usually take the form of short-term tax credits, often phased out for the upper-middle class and above.
Standard economic theory on the differing effects of types of tax changes, as Henderson notes, is that marginal tax rates are the most important factor in determining the economic drag of taxation. Type 1 tax cuts generally affect marginal rates the most, while Type 3 tax cuts generally affect marginal rates not at all, so Romer’s empirical findings appear to be perfectly consistant with standard economic theory.
The tax cuts Obama has been proposing are mainly expanded deductions and credits, while the tax cuts Mankiw has been proposing are mainly broad reductions in tax rates (an employer-side payroll tax holiday to encourage short-term hiring and a cut in taxes on savings and investment to support long-term recovery). Looked at in this light, the CEA estimate of a 0.99 multiplier for Obama’s tax cuts and Mankiw’s estimate of a 2.0-3.0 multiplier for his own proposed tax cuts are both correct applications of Romer’s research.

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There’s an old rabbinic saying: "When a woman comes from a far country and tells you she’s divorced, believe her." When people who for reasons other than economic ones want to expand the role of government argue in favor of expanding the role of government with massive bailouts and fiscal stimulus in the form of a public works program or the like, it’s one thing. When people who for reasons other than economic ones want to cut taxes argue for tax cuts, I similarly take their arguments with a grain of salt.
When people who would normally be calling for a tax cut start arguing in favor of a big public works program, I’ll view it differently.
While some are ideologically tied to tax cuts, I have come to think that most tax cuts can be of only marginal benefit at this time. The few that would make the most dramatic difference–say, getting rid of the capital gains tax–are not going to happen. So it’s mostly a question of how otherwise to stimulate.
Temporarily waiving the payroll tax as Mankiw is proposing would have a huge immediate impact if the employer share is included, as that would immediately cut companies’ payroll costs by 7.65% without layoffs. That should stop layoffs by firms that are fundamentally solvent in the long run, and it would likely accelerate when firms start hiring again as the recession bottoms out.
Yes I take it back, that one probably would be helpful and might even stand a chance of passing.
I question whether capital gains tax would do much of anything for the economy. First of all, who has any capital gains right now anyway? Second, there is a reasonable argument that one of the big contributing factors to the current crises is there was too much investment capital chasing too few investment opportunities. This caused the capital to slowly flow into more and more speculative investments. To fix the economy we need to stimulate more consumption now, not more investment.
Ideas such as temporarily waiving the payroll tax for employers do not look viable to me. This may cause some employers to lay off fewer people, but it doesn’t seem to me that it will do much to bost consumption. There are companies that are not in any real trouble right now. (Praise the lord that I appear to be working for one of those). Those companies are unlikely to pass those benefits on to employees. In the short term they would just horde the cash, because cash is king right now. You don’t want to be a business that needs to borrow money at the moment.
I’m having a real hard time coming up with an economic explanation as to how a dollar spent by government creates so much more wealth than the same dollar spent by an individual.Â
Mikeca,
Second, there is a reasonable argument that one of the big contributing factors to the current crises is there was too much investment capital chasing too few investment opportunities. This caused the capital to slowly flow into more and more speculative investments.
That’s interesting, but I have my doubts, at least as a "big" contributing factor that is unique to today’s troubles. Can you point me to a link, article, economist, whoever that makes this argument, I would like to read more.
The major speculative bubble whose popping triggered this crisis was real estate, not equities. A capital gains tax cut would make it easier for companies with strong long-term fundamentals to raise capital to ride out the crisis without cutbacks.
It’s important to note that investment is a form of consumption. Acme, Inc issues a share of stock and sells it to me for $20. Acme then spends that $20 on salaries, equipment, materials, buildings, etc. That investment stimulates demand just as much as if I bought $20 worth of government bonds and the government spent that money building bridges. The only difference is that Acme expects to turn a profit.
"The major speculative bubble whose popping triggered this crisis was real estate, not equities."
Yes, but the real estate bubble was funded by mortgages given to people on terms they could never be expected to repay (subprime loans). That was made possible by creating a whole new funding mechanism for home mortgages by issuing bonds and other financial instruments that were so complicated most people could not understand the risk. So much investment capital flowed into these risky mortgage back securities because people were desperately looking for investments with a good return. There was just too much investment capital and not enough good things to invest it in.
Mortgage backed securities aren’t new. They date back to 1970. The MBS bubble was caused by the housing bubble (and fed back into it in turn, but the housing bubble started first, in the late 90s), which broke the formulas used by regulators and bond rating agencies to evaluate the riskiness of MBSs, so MBSs based on increasingly risky underlying loans still appeared safe.
Regardless of the cause of the bubble, it’s clear there’s a shortage of investment capital right now. You said yourself, "You don’t want to be a business that needs to borrow money at the moment."
mortgages by issuing bonds and other financial instruments that were so complicated most people could not understand the risk.Â
This is a really trivial statement.  It’s not yet 10am and I can think of a bunch of items I’ve used today that "most" people (myself included) wouldn’t understand with any depth(microwave, internal combustion engine, satellite radio, etc). Â
With any asset backed by mortgages (regardless of the structure) the risk is always that the mortgages won’t pay.  Mortgages don’t pay, investment doesn’t pay. I don’t think it is that complicated to understand. Clearly the risk was underestimated, but I don’t know that it was misunderstood. Â
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So much investment capital flowed into these risky mortgage back securities because people were desperately looking for investments with a good return. There was just too much investment capital and not enough good things to invest it in.
Again, this makes little sense to me, at least on the surface. I’m just trying to imagine the scenario where someone had so much money, but stock market returns weren’t good enough, so they went out and bought a bunch of CMOs? And this was so widespread that it became a "big" contributing factor?Â
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